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ABSTRACT Article 12(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
guarantees persons with disabilities ‘the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others in
all aspects of life.’ In its General Comment on Article 12, the Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities claims that this guarantee necessitates the abolition of the world’s domi-
nant approach to mental capacity law. According to this approach, when a person lacks the
mental capacity to make a particular legal decision at the material time, the state authorises a
third-party to make it on her behalf. The Committee declares such substituted decision-making
a violation of the Convention’s guarantee of legal capacity on an equal basis, and therefore
demands it be replaced by an allegedly non-discriminatory alternative called supported deci-
sion-making. This article argues that we should reject the Committee’s demand in its current
form, because the most inﬂuential version of the new approach to supported decision-making
suffers from serious conceptual ﬂaws that make it inferior to the mental capacity approach.
However, I then argue that the Committee’s demand stems from a legitimate ethical concern
with respect and equality that ought to inform the CRPD’s implementation process.
1. Introduction
This is a critical moment in international disability law.1 With the implementation
process of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in full swing, sig-
natory states are scrambling to meet their obligations under the treaty. Among the
many ethically charged controversies surrounding this process, none is more hotly
contested than the debate over the right of persons with cognitive and psychosocial
disabilities to make their own decisions in times of crisis. At the centre of this debate
is Article 12 of the Convention, which enjoins signatories to ‘recognize that persons
with disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all
aspects of life.’2 According to a growing chorus of critics,3 the world’s dominant
approach to legal capacity stands in violation of this demand.
Legal capacity is the capacity to make decisions with legal effect. Today’s dominant
approach to the concept forges a strong link between mental capacity4 and legal capac-
ity: when P lacks the mental capacity to make a particular legal decision at the material
time, the state restricts (or removes) P’s legal capacity to make that decision and autho-
rises a third-party decision-maker to make a substitute decision on P’s behalf. Call this
the mental capacity approach to legal capacity (henceforth referred to as MC).
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Critics object that MC falls foul of Article 12 on grounds of discrimination. Persons
with disabilities are far more likely to have their legal capacity restricted (or removed)
on the basis of a mental capacity assessment, and, critics claim, such interventions
result in trauma, stigma, and objectiﬁcation. This is not just a dry legal criticism but
also an ethical demand made by and for the world’s largest minority.5 On these
grounds, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has called on states
to abolish MC and to replace all regimes of substitute decision-making with an alter-
native model called supported decision-making.6
In what follows, I argue that we should reject the Committee’s demand in its cur-
rent form. For the most inﬂuential version of the new approach to supported decision-
making suffers from conceptual ﬂaws that make it less transparent and respectful than
MC. And it seems that MC already has the resources it needs to overcome the appar-
ent legal and ethical problems associated with substitute decision-making. My goals,
however, are not purely negative. I disagree with those who dismiss the Committee’s
demand as muddled radicalism from the fringes of the disability community.7 Instead,
I argue that it stems from a legitimate ethical concern with respect and equality that
should inform the current implementation process. Attending sensitively to this con-
cern, I argue, will improve our odds of reducing the harms caused by legal capacity
denials, thereby bringing us closer to meeting our legal and moral obligations.
2. The Mental Capacity Approach
During the second half of the 20th century, MC emerged from the interaction of the
legal literature on informed consent and medical ethics research on patient auton-
omy.8 The approach was in part motivated by criticisms of earlier models. For
instance, critics accused guardianship regimes of excessive restriction – as they often
divest persons with disabilities of the right to make any legal decisions – and status-
based approaches of direct discrimination – as they permit the removal of legal capac-
ity on the basis of a diagnosis of disability. MC avoids excessive restriction by limiting
interventions to a particular decision at the time it must be made. And it combats
direct discrimination by relying on mental capacity assessments that can apply to any
member of the general population. That is, it uses a ‘functional test’ or an ‘abilities
test’ that any person can fail – whether she lacks mental capacity due to disability or
some other cause (e.g. intoxication) – and that persons with disabilities can pass, if
they demonstrate certain decision-making abilities.9 There are different versions of this
approach around the world, but they tend to share three core features:
1. When a person P10 lacks the mental capacity to make a particular legal decision
at the time it must be made, the state restricts (or removes) P’s legal capacity to
make that decision.
2. Judgments that P lacks the requisite mental capacity to make the relevant legal
decision are based on a functional test designed to assess P’s decision-making
abilities.11
3. Finally, if a functional test demonstrates that P lacks the mental capacity to
make the relevant decision, and a decision must be made, a substitute decision-
maker decides on P’s behalf.
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Some proponents of MC will object to my characterisation of the ﬁrst core feature
here. In response to the criticism that MC restricts legal capacity on an unequal basis,
they argue that MC doesn’t restrict (or remove) P’s legal capacity at all: it merely
recognises the factual absence of decision-making abilities, and so acknowledges the
factual absence of the ability to make decisions with legal effect. There’s logic in this:
if we index legal capacity to decision-making abilities, then the absence of the latter
does imply the absence of the former. However, the law operates with a presumption
of capacity; that is, prior to any intervention, it presumes that P possesses mental
capacity. Thus, prior to any intervention, P often enjoys a kind of de facto legal capac-
ity. She makes what are at least presumed to be decisions, and these putative decisions
will have legal effect until the state intervenes and restricts (or removes) her right to
make them. It is at best highly artiﬁcial to suggest that such interventions in no way
restrict (or remove) – but merely recognise the absence of – P’s legal capacity. In
many cases, P suffers the loss of legal freedoms she has previously enjoyed and that
she would go on enjoying were it not for such interventions. Obscuring this fact for-
feits one of MC’s greatest ethical strengths – its transparency about the actual trade-
offs substitute decision-making entails. As I will show below, this is a strength that
MC’s new rival lacks. It would be a shame to abandon this transparency simply to
offer a facile rejoinder to critics.
The ideal of transparency also explains why MC forges such a strong link between
legal capacity and decision-making ability: the law needs a clear standard to determine
when it can (or cannot) fairly hold an agent accountable for her decision. For MC,
decision-making ability underwrites this standard, because such ability is a necessary
condition for making autonomous decisions. To be clear, the idea is not to establish a
global condition of autonomy, but only to strive to ensure that particular decisions are
autonomous at the time they are made. This approach to legal accountability is analo-
gous to the rational abilities view of moral responsibility. According to the rational
abilities view, an agent can be held responsible for what she does only if she has the
abilities i) to recognise good reasons for acting and ii) to translate those reasons into
decisions and actions.12 Analogously, the mental capacity approach maintains that an
agent can decide autonomously and so be held legally accountable for her decision
only if she has the decision-making abilities – e.g. understanding, reasoning, the ability
to weigh risks – that allow her to recognise good reasons and translate them into a
decision.13 As O’Shea and Freyenhagen (2013) point out, this is not a normatively
neutral approach but rather a substantive one: to make autonomous decisions an agent
must be able to see the world for what it is and be suitably sensitive to the right sorts
of reasons.14 However, the approach is not strongly but rather weakly substantive –
the agent need not recognise good reasons as such, whatever those might be, but rather
what she considers good reasons. This is the general standard that mental capacity law
sets for autonomous decision-making: at the time a decision is made the agent must
be able to decide with reason-sensitive decision-making abilities in light of her own
sense of what matters. The functional test mentioned above is designed to determine
whether agents meet this standard. If an agent fails that test at a given time, then, on
this view, she cannot decide autonomously and the law cannot fairly hold her account-
able for any decision she makes. Thus, if a decision must be made at that time, it falls
to the state to authorise a substitute decision-maker to decide on her behalf and to
take accountability for the decision.
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This approach to legal capacity can be found in several human rights instruments,
and it is the most commonly used approach throughout the world.15 It has been
championed in particular by Western democracies because it promotes two fundamen-
tal aims of the liberal state – to respect individual autonomy and to protect non-auton-
omous citizens facing signiﬁcant risks.
3. On an Equal Basis
According to the Committee’s General Comment on Article 12, even if MC rules out
excessive restriction and direct discrimination, it still fails to meet the Convention’s
anti-discrimination provisions. Article 2 of the CRPD deﬁnes discrimination on the
basis of disability as ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability
which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights . . .’16 The language of
‘purpose or effect’ here mirrors the distinction between direct discrimination – which
has discriminatory intent – and indirect discrimination – which has discriminatory
effects without the surface signs of intent. Since direct discrimination isn’t the prob-
lem, the charge of indirect discrimination becomes an obvious candidate.
Indirect discrimination occurs when treatment that is not on its face discriminatory
nevertheless disproportionately and unfavourably impacts a particular group.17 Notice
that disproportionate impact alone is not enough to establish indirect discrimination;
one must also show that the treatment is unfavourable. This poses a problem in the
current case. It’s undeniable that the mental capacity approach disproportionately
impacts persons with disabilities: the vast majority of legal capacity denials happen to
persons with cognitive and psychosocial disabilities.18 But whether the treatment is
unfavourable hinges signiﬁcantly on the views of those affected by it; and those
affected are divided on the subject.
What makes legal capacity denials unfavourable? Answers to this question typically
centre on two types of harm: trauma and stigma. With regard to trauma, critics focus
on coercive psychiatric interventions, with some arguing that these practices ‘violate
the universal prohibition of torture’.19 As evidence for this, they cite cases where per-
sons with disabilities have ‘died [in treatment] or been permanently scarred’ by it,20
highlight similarities between legal deﬁnitions of torture and the experience of forced
drugging and electroshock,21 and share the stories of service users who recount their
time in psychiatric facilities in terms of suffering and humiliation.22 Although the tor-
ture comparison is open to challenges – as torture aims to inﬂict harm while treatment
has therapeutic goals – there’s no doubt that such experiences can be traumatic. When
it comes to stigma, critics argue that legal capacity denials reinforce stereotypes that
persons with disabilities are incompetent, and that they cause self-stigma by teaching
persons with disabilities to view themselves through the lens of these stereotypes.23
This not only can have a devastating impact on their self-regard and psychological
wellbeing, but it can also undermine their social life and career goals.24
But what proportion of those affected ﬁnd the treatment unfavourable? The empiri-
cal evidence, though limited, sheds some light on this question. A large prospective
study of involuntary psychiatric patients in 11 countries found that after one month
55% of patients thought their admission was the right decision and after three months
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that number rose to 63%.25 The same study also found that in countries with stronger
patient autonomy safeguards – like the functional tests described above – approval
rates were at 71% after one month and 86% after three. Finally, the ﬁndings of smal-
ler-scale, qualitative studies report similar results. One found that 47% viewed their
forced treatment positively and 20% were ambivalent about it,26 while another found
that up to 77.8% viewed it as beneﬁcial.27 While this evidence is hardly conclusive, it
suggests that at least half of those subjected to coercive interventions – and signiﬁ-
cantly more when legal mechanisms are in place to protect patient autonomy – view
the treatment as favourable. It’s also worth noting that this data comes from the most
ethically fraught subset of legal capacity denials, i.e. forced treatment. The bulk of
legal capacity denials won’t involve such an extreme conﬂict between P and substitute
decision-makers, which suggests that overall the favourability statistics could be even
higher. It seems, then, that we have evidence for disproportionate impact and unfa-
vourable impact, but it’s unclear that there’s a case for disproportionate unfavourable
impact.
However, critics have another line of argument to establish indirect discrimination.
This is the claim that legal capacity denials are intrinsically objectifying, because they
treat persons with disabilities as ‘objects to be pitied and cared for rather than as subjects
before the law’.28 The idea here is that deciding for oneself is essential to being the
subject of a life, and so to override someone’s decision is to quash her subjectivity and
thereby treat her like an object. Legal capacity denials are thus non-remediably unfa-
vourable. Moreover, if legal capacity denials disproportionately impact persons with
disabilities and they are intrinsically unfavourable, then they necessarily result in dis-
proportionate unfavourable impact.
But legal capacity denials aren’t intrinsically objectifying. Imagine P is admitted to
the emergency room suffering from delusions due not to disability but rather to having
ingested some psychoactive substance. The medical team determines P needs a life-
saving operation, but P refuses treatment because he believes the doctors intend to kill
him. To restrain P – by the least coercive means available – and then operate would
not be to treat him like an object. In fact, such an intervention would acknowledge P
as the subject of a life worth living, while letting him die due to a temporary loss of
autonomy would be inhumanly callous and myopic.
Even if we defuse the universal claim, however, isn’t it still possible that in the
majority of cases mental capacity denials objectify persons with disabilities? The empir-
ical evidence cited above suggests otherwise. If such denials objectiﬁed the majority of
those they affect, it’s unlikely that so many people affected by them would view them
in favourable terms. Moreover, any attempt to discount such positive appraisals with
appeals to false consciousness and the like would be viciously self-contradictory in this
case, as the core demand of the CRPD is that we respect the views of persons with
disabilities. At this point, then, it’s unclear whether substitute decision-making in fact
results in indirect discrimination.29
From an ethical point of view, however, this technical legal issue isn’t all-important.
Perhaps as more evidence comes in, a broader consensus will emerge to the effect that
substitute decision-making results in indirect discrimination, creating new legal duties
for the Convention’s signatories. But even if that never happens, the issues addressed
in this section clearly give rise to moral duties vis-a-vis persons with disabilities who
feel harmed by legal capacity denials. No amount of harm – be it trauma, stigma, or
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objectiﬁcation – is morally permissible if we can prevent it by making what we all
agree are reasonable and materially feasible adjustments to our practices.30 So if this is
a case of indirect discrimination, then signatories of the CRPD might have a legal duty
to reform certain aspects of MC. But even if it isn’t a case of indirect discrimination,
we still seem to have a moral duty to make reasonable adjustments to our substitute
decision-making practices that will reduce (if not eliminate) unnecessary harms suf-
fered by persons with disabilities.
Critics of MC have proposed what such reasonable adjustments would look like –
what is often referred to in the relevant literature as the ‘new paradigm’ of supported
decision-making.31 According to some proponents of the new paradigm, a particular
model of supported decision-making could overcome the apparent problem of dis-
crimination by drastically reducing (if not eliminating) the harms associated with sub-
stitute decision-making.
4. The Will and Preferences Approach
In general terms, supported decision-making is the practice of helping someone make
a decision for herself. Certain proponents of the new paradigm, however, take this
benign practice to a controversial extreme. The ﬁrst step in this direction is to take a
relational view of decision-making as a fundamentally collaborative enterprise – we
make up our minds with our signiﬁcant others, and these relationships can enhance
(or impair) our decision-making ability.32 The second step is to embrace the social
model of disability inscribed in the Preamble of the Convention.33 On this view, dis-
ability is not the deﬁcit of a particular individual but rather the result of her personal
characteristics interacting disadvantageously with her social context.34 If a person with
disabilities is incapable of exercising her legal capacity, it is often due to a mismatch
between her personal makeup and the contingent arrangement of her social
environment.
So far, none of this necessarily conﬂicts with MC. In fact, supported decision-mak-
ing plays an integral role in most mental capacity legal frameworks,35 and many juris-
dictions require that substitute decision-makers take every reasonable measure to help
a person make her own decision before deciding on her behalf.36 Moreover, courts
have found that individuals who lack the capacity to make a solo decision can some-
times retain the ability to make their own decisions with support.
The contrast and controversy emerge, however, when defenders of the new paradigm
take a third step away from traditional approaches by indexing legal capacity not to cog-
nitive decision-making abilities but rather to the non-cognitive ability to have a will or
preference. Call this the will and preferences approach to legal capacity (henceforth
referred to as WP).37 Before outlining how the approach is supposed to work, it’s
important to note that WP is not the ofﬁcial representative of the new paradigm, which
is a big tent under which many people with diverse views gather. Moreover, although
its general comments do reﬂect the inﬂuence of WP, the Committee hasn’t explicitly
endorsed the approach. However, WP merits our attention because it has exercised
considerable inﬂuence on this debate and it has some worrisome implications.
According to WP, for the state to attribute legal capacity to P, she must meet the
following minimum threshold for decision-making capacity: she must have a
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discernible will or preference. And P meets this minimum threshold when it’s possible
for P or P’s support person to make a decision that is consistent with P’s diachronic
identity, i.e. P’s identity across time. In other words, to have a will or preference is to
be able to make a decision that is consistent with your diachronic identity, or for some-
one else to be able to do this for you. According to WP, where X is a legal decision, P has
legal capacity to make decision X if and only if P (or someone else) can make a deci-
sion about X that is consistent with P’s diachronic identity.
WP thus replaces the rational abilities view of autonomous decision-making with a
non-cognitivist mesh theory. According to mesh theories, actions are free when they
instantiate the right sort of mesh or ﬁt between elements of a person’s psychology.38
The best-known example of such a theory is Frankfurt’s hierarchical view, which
understands freedom of the will as the mesh between a person’s ﬁrst-order desire –
what he wants – and his second-order volition – what he wants to want.39 On WP,
the mesh required for a decision to be autonomous – that is, for a decision to be P’s
own – is between the decision and P’s identity. An autonomous decision doesn’t
require any cognitive abilities, then; it only requires that P’s decision – whoever
makes it – mesh with her diachronic identity. P can make her own decision with sup-
port – a supported decision in the standard sense. But it’s also possible, on this view,
for support to realise P’s decision for her without her even being aware of it. This is
supposed to be a new kind of supported decision called a facilitated decision.
What if it’s impossible to know what a person wants? Say, for example, P is uncon-
scious, a decision must be made, and no one knows anything about P.40 According to
WP, even a facilitated decision made without knowledge of P’s preferences should be
guided by an effort to discern what P would do. This seems to be what the Committee
has in mind when it writes, ‘Where . . . it is not practicable to determine the will and
preference of an individual, “best interpretation of will and preference” must replace
“best interests” determinations.’41 In all circumstances, then, the facilitator strives to
realise P’s will and preferences. With this claim, WP can argue that legal capacity is a
universal feature of human nature and a fundamental human right. For on this view,
P can exercise her legal capacity in every case regardless of her condition. This is why
proponents of WP view it as the least coercive means to promote the autonomy of per-
sons with disabilities. As they see it, WP never infringes on P’s autonomy.
But respect for autonomy is not the only state aim at stake here – there’s also the
matter of safety. Does WP’s insistence on the right of persons with disabilities to, as
the Committee puts it, ‘take risks and make mistakes’ commit it to a doctrine of total
non-interference?42 And if so, has it purchased the right to legal capacity at the cost of
serious harm to vulnerable people?43 This is not WP’s stance on intervention. Even if
it left the legal capacity of persons with disabilities intact, total non-interference would
have harmful effects on persons with disabilities, violating their right to ‘physical and
mental integrity’,44 their ‘right to life’,45 and/or their right to ‘the highest attainable
standard of health’.46 Thus, WP recognises the need for a protective intervention
mechanism.47
But how can we intervene in P’s affairs without reneging on the promise to never
infringe on her autonomy? WP offers a kind of workaround here: if P’s decisions are
autonomous only when they mesh with her diachronic identity, then to intervene on
her behalf when this mesh fails to obtain – in order to re-establish it – is not to
infringe on her autonomy but rather to restore it.48 Bach and Kerzner illustrate this
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with the following example: imagine a young man with a psychosocial disorder
becomes hostile, aggressive, and paranoid to the point that his supporters can no
longer discern a will or preference consistent with his identity.49 Since his behaviour
fails to satisfy the diachronic criterion, it no longer expresses his agency, and it’s per-
missible for supporters to intervene and initiate procedures to help him recover.50 WP
thus leaves room for ‘constraining choice and personal dignity’51 and admitting people
to a facility for assessment ‘without their consent’.52
Like MC, then, WP aims to respect individual autonomy and safeguard non-autono-
mous agents facing signiﬁcant risks. If a decision meshes with P’s diachronic identity –
regardless of her mental capacity – WP does not permit interference, even if it poses
serious risks. However, if no such mesh obtains, WP permits us to intervene if P faces
signiﬁcant risks. By this logic, WP represents a less harmful alternative to MC because
i) it never restricts P’s legal capacity, and ii) it safeguards P’s welfare by intervening
when she is non-autonomous and faces signiﬁcant risks.
This conclusion hinges crucially on the premise that supported decision-making
allows P to retain full legal capacity even when the intervention mechanism kicks in.53
This premise, I submit, is false. Even if we grant the legitimacy of indexing legal capac-
ity to the mere presence of a will or preference – a point I don’t grant and will return to
in the next paragraph – there is little reason to think that supported decision-making
could realise P’s legal capacity in every instance. As just seen, WP allows the state to
‘constrain P’s choice’, to admit her to hospital without her consent, and to treat what
she says as non-expressive of her will and preferences. If P explicitly says she wants to
X and support workers override her decision because X-ing doesn’t mesh with their
interpretation of her diachronic identity, they thereby deny her the right to make a deci-
sion on the grounds that they understand who she is better than she does. The claim
that this is not a coercive denial of P’s legal capacity is a kind of doublespeak where
coercion doesn’t always mean coercion. What WP calls facilitated decisions – decisions
made for P without P’s input (or even against P’s input) – are not a new kind of sup-
ported decision. They are substitute decisions masquerading as support.
This criticism only scratches the surface of the objections one could level against
WP’s diachronic mesh theory. Does it make sense to call a decision your own when
you don’t understand it – or when you don’t know that it’s been made – simply
because it meshes with your identity? The reasons to doubt this are too numerous to
canvass here, so I’ll just identify ﬁve salient worries. First, many decisions seem to lose
their character as autonomous without a certain level of understanding. For example,
consider how different the Socratic narrative would read if Socrates drank the hemlock
without knowing it would kill him, or if he was unconscious and his suicide was a
facilitated decision. Would he still be, as Wayne Martin describes him, one of philoso-
phy’s greatest ‘autonomy heroes’?54 Secondly, it’s unclear why we should privilege dia-
chronic identity as the ultimate criterion for autonomous decisions. People with
episodic identities, for instance, might reject such a criterion. Thirdly, in many cases,
a diachronic criterion would be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to use in practice. If P’s life
lacks sufﬁcient narrative coherence, or P’s care workers lack sufﬁcient knowledge
about P’s life, a diachronic criterion could do little to ﬁx P’s will and preferences
regarding a particular decision. Fourth, this approach cannot furnish a standard to
determine when the law can (or cannot) fairly hold an agent accountable for her deci-
sions. If P decides autonomously whenever her decision meshes with her diachronic
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identity, is she therefore accountable for all such decisions, even when she doesn’t
understand them or isn’t involved in making them? Finally, WP raises serious worries
about manipulation. One of the major criticisms of mesh theories is that the source of
the relevant psychological mesh can undermine the freedom that that mesh allegedly
instantiates. For example, Fischer and Ravizza worry about Frankfurt’s so-called ‘will-
ing addict’ – who wants to use his drug of choice and also wants to want to use it –
asking, What if the drugs cause the relevant second-order desire?55 In other words, is
the willing addict still free if he only wants to want heroin because he’s addicted to it?
To raise a similar objection in this context, does the autonomy-conferring mesh obtain
in a facilitated decision whenever the support person says it does? What happens when
manipulation dons the mantle of support?
It’s also worth noting here that once it becomes clear that WP authorises substitute
decisions (aka facilitated decisions), it loses much of its apparent novelty. It has not
invented a new kind of supported decision-making; and it hasn’t developed a new
decision-making standard either. The diachronic criterion it champions is very similar
to a standard commonly used within the mental capacity paradigm, i.e. the substituted
judgment standard. This standard is typically interpreted as a rule that substitute deci-
sion-makers ought to endeavour to make the decision that P would make if she had
mental capacity. And the diachronic standard looks like little more than a particular
interpretation of that rule – speciﬁcally, it understands ‘the decision P would make’ as
a decision that is consistent with P’s will and preferences interpreted in light of her
diachronic identity. Moreover, this is remarkably similar to other existing interpreta-
tions of the substituted judgment standard, e.g. Brudney’s view that the point of this
standard is to promote the authenticity of P’s life by making decisions consistent with
the life she’s lived thus far.56 The most recent in-depth discussion of WP by Szmukler
and Bach even deploys this language of authenticity, arguing that the aim of an inter-
vention should be ‘to give effect as much as is possible to the “authentic” will and
preferences [of P].’57
The goal behind WP – to put P’s preferences at the centre of decisions that shape
her life – is ethically laudable, but some of its implications are unacceptable. In partic-
ular, WP seems less transparent than MC, because it obscures the trade-off being
made in substitute decisions: the coercive denial of P’s legal capacity to protect her
from harm. As the reader will recall, WP’s fault here is similar to the ethical blunder
defenders of MC commit when they claim that MC does not restrict but merely
recognises the factual absence of P’s legal capacity. This lack of transparency is unac-
ceptable in both cases.
5. Conclusion – Transforming Practice
To challenge WP’s dialectical contribution is not to question the ethical impulse that
animates it, nor is it to disparage the larger movement it aims to represent. My goal is
rather to suggest that, thus far at least, the movement’s promise lies not in novel theo-
retical contributions but in its potential to transform the way we actually treat persons
with disabilities in practice. The idea that P’s preferences should determine the deci-
sions made on her behalf already exists in the literature on substitute decision-making.
But in practice this idea is too often crowded out by legal worries about liability and
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the well-intentioned but overly paternalistic impulse to protect vulnerable people. Our
inability to put this idea into practice has some steep ethical costs, some of which I
mentioned above, namely, trauma, stigma, and objectiﬁcation. But I have yet to
address what I take to be its greatest ethical cost, a particular form of harm that advo-
cates of the new paradigm, including proponents of WP, are rightly striving to reduce.
The harm in question has to do with the fact that some persons with disabilities
experience the denial of their legal capacity as a fundamental denial of recognition
respect. Here I understand recognition respect in Darwall’s sense as the ﬁtting
response to a person’s dignity – the disposition to give appropriate weight in your
practical deliberations to the other person’s moral worth.58 To deny a person recogni-
tion respect in this sense is to deny her dignity as a person. And the experience of
such denial goes hand in hand with the sense that one is not an equal member of the
human community. That is, we think people deserve equal respect because in some
deep sense they are equals, and so to be denied recognition respect is to be denied sta-
tus as an equal.59 Such denial constitutes an insidious and destructive kind of harm –
the painful sense that you exist on a moral plane beneath those around you.60
Why do some persons experience the denial of their legal capacity as a denial of
recognition respect while others don’t? In most cases, those who view the treatment as
respectful do so because they agree – in real-time or in retrospect – that it was the
right thing to do. To return to my earlier example, the patient who refuses a life-sav-
ing operation due to a temporary drug-induced paranoia will not view his forcible
restraint as disrespectful once he recovers his wherewithal. He will admit that he
wasn’t himself and will be grateful for the help. This is surely why WP allows substi-
tute decisions when they mesh with P’s diachronic identity. Such interventions don’t
deny P recognition respect as a person; they only refuse to respect a temporary state
of P’s mind that he too will come to reject. However, there is a special category of per-
sons with disabilities who will tend to experience the denial of their legal capacity as a
denial of recognition respect – people subjected to coercive treatment who cannot – in
the moment or afterwards – see it as a legitimate form of assistance. This category
includes a) people who are in fact subjected to illegitimate coercive treatment and b)
people who objectively need help but whose cognitive predicament prevents them from
recognising that need. This is backed by a simple intuition: whether you’re factually
right (case a) or wrong (case b), if you see yourself as capable of making your own
decisions, then having those decisions forcibly overridden by someone who claims to
know better cannot but be experienced as a denial of recognition respect and a funda-
mental insult to the sense of yourself as a person of equal social standing. It’s not hard
to see how the prolonged experience of this sense of disrespect and demotion could
destroy a person’s sense of self worth. As Judge Eldergill wrote recently in her decision
in the Court of Protection of England and Wales,
. . . individual liberty is of the same fundamental importance to incapacitated
people who still have clear wishes and preferences about where and how they
live as it is for those who remain able to make capacitous decisions . . . most
individuals wish to determine and develop their own interests and course in
life, and their happiness often depends on this.61
The harms associated with the experience of being denied recognition respect and
the loss of one’s sense of self-determination can at times be worse than the signiﬁcant
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risks P would face were the state not to intervene. The failure to appreciate this fact in
practice – often driven by liability worries and an overweening paternalistic impulse –
is one of the major failings of contemporary care practice that the current disability
rights movement stands poised to correct. And it’s best chance of doing so, in my
view, is not to abolish MC and replace it with WP, but rather to highlight ideas within
the mental capacity paradigm that need strengthening in order to achieve the laudable
ethical goal of putting P’s preferences at the centre of the decisions that shape her life.
This will call not for novel theoretical constructs but rather for concrete policies and
practices that motivate care professionals to treat persons with disabilities as persons
entitled to recognition respect who prize their sense of liberty as much as any other
person. Instead of scrapping the world’s dominant approach to legal capacity, then,
we need to devote more time to thinking about how to make the essential practice of
substitute decision-making as respectful as possible, especially when it comes to the
trade-off between recognition respect and individual welfare.
Matthew Burch, Philosophy Department, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester,
CO4 3SQ, UK. mburch@essex.ac.uk
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